The battle of Coulmiers (November 9) was followed by a
period of inaction on the part of the Loire Army. Had D'Aurelle pursued
Von der Tann he might have turned his barren victory to good account. But
he had not much confidence in his troops, and the weather was bad--sleet
and snow falling continually. Moreover, the French commander believed that
the Bavarian retreat concealed a trap. At a conference held between him,
Gambetta, Freyoinet, and the generals at the head of the various army
corps, only one of the latter---Chanzy--favoured an immediate march on
Paris. Borel, who was chief of D'Aurelle's staff, proposed to confine
operations to an advance on Chartres, which would certainly have been a
good position to occupy, for it would have brought the army nearer to the
capital, giving it two railway lines, those of Le Mans and Granville, for
revictualling purposes, and enabling it to retreat on Brittany in the
event of any serious reverse. But no advance at all was made. The Germans
were allowed all necessary time to increase their forces, the French
remaining inactive within D'Aurelle's lines, and their _morale_ steadily
declining by reason of the hardships to which they were subjected.
Pages:
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314