It concerned the date when the fall of Paris
would become inevitable. We--my father and myself--had said repeatedly at
Versailles and elsewhere that the capital's supply of food would last
until the latter days of January, and that the city (unless in the
meanwhile it were relieved) must then surrender. Authentic information to
that effect was available in Paris before we quitted it in November.
Of course Trochu's message to Chanzy was official, and carried greater
weight than the assertions of journalists. It was to the effect that it
would be necessary to negotiate a capitulation on January 20, in order to
give time for the revictualling of the city's two million inhabitants.
As it happened, the resistance was prolonged for another week or so.
However, Boisdeffre's information was sufficiently explicit to show Chanzy
that no time must be lost if Paris was to be saved.
Some German cavalry--probably the same men who had pursued Gougeard's
column--showed themselves at Saint Calais, which is only some thirty
miles north-east of Le Mans, as early as December 18, but soon retired,
and no further advance of the enemy in that direction took place for
several days.
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