But if Chanzy's spirits did not fail him, those of his men were at a very
low ebb indeed. He was repeatedly told so by subordinate commanders;
nevertheless (there was something Napoleonic in his character), he would
not desist from his design, but issued instructions that there was to be a
resolute defence of the lines on the 11th, together with a determined
effort to regain all lost positions. At the same time, the statements of
the divisional generals respecting the low _morale_ of some of the troops
were not left unheeded, for a very significant order went forth, namely,
that cavalry should be drawn up in the rear of the infantry wherever this
might appear advisable. The inference was obvious.
Three divisions and Lalande's Breton Mobilises were to hold the
south-eastern lines from Arnage along the track known as the Chemin des
Boeufs, and to link up, as well as possible, with Paris's and Gougeard's
divisions, to which fell the duty of guarding the plateau of Auvours and
the banks of the Huisne. The rest of the 21st Corps (to which Gougeard's
division belonged) was to defend the space between the Huisne and the
Sarthe. Colomb's fragmentary force, apart from Paris's division, was still
to cover Le Mans towards the north-east.
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