Of actual cowardice there were undoubtedly numerous instances during the
war, but a great deal might be said in defence of many of the men who here
and there abandoned their positions. During the last months their
sufferings were frequently terrible. At best they were often only
partially trained. There was little cohesion in many battalions. There was
a great lack of efficient non-commissioned officers. Instead of drafting
regular soldiers from the _depots_ into special regiments, as was often
done, it might have been better to have distributed them among the Mobiles
and Mobilises, whom they would have steadied. Judging by all that I
witnessed at that period, I consider it essential that any territorial
force should always contain a certain number of trained soldiers who have
previously been in action. And any such force should always have the
support of regulars and of efficient artillery. I have related how certain
Breton Mobilises abandoned La Tuilerie. They fled before the regulars or
the artillery could support them; but they were, perhaps, the very rawest
levies in all Chanzy's forces. Other Breton Mobilises, on other points,
fought very well for men of their class.
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