Garland and Mr. Marr, another applicant for admission,
who had participated in the rebellion, filing printed arguments--and
by Mr. Speed, of Kentucky, and Mr. Henry Stanbery, the Attorney-General,
on the other side. The whole subject of expurgatory oaths was discussed,
and all that could be said on either side was fully and elaborately
presented.
The Court in its decision followed the reasoning of the Cummings
case and held the law invalid, as applied to the exercise of the
petitioner's right to practice his profession; that such right was
not a mere indulgence, a matter of grace and favor, revocable at the
pleasure of the Court, or at the command of the legislature; but was
a right of which the petitioner could be deprived only by the judgment
of the Court for moral or professional delinquency. The Court also
held that the pardon of the petitioner released him from all penalties
and disabilities attached to the offence of treason committed by his
participation in the rebellion, and that, so far as that offence was
concerned, he was placed beyond the reach of punishment of any kind.
But to exclude him by reason of that offence--that is, by requiring
him to take an oath that he had never committed it--was to enforce
a punishment for it notwithstanding the pardon; and that it was not
within the constitutional power of Congress thus to inflict punishment
beyond the reach of executive clemency.
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