"
The petitioner was accordingly discharged from arrest.
[1] NOTE.--I find the following apt illustrations of this doctrine
in a journal of the day:
If a military or naval officer of the United States, in the
necessary suppression of a mutiny or enforcement of obedience,
should wound or take the life of a subordinate, would it
be contended that, if arrested for that act by the State
authority, he could not be released on _habeas corpus_,
because no statute expressly authorized the performance of the
act? If the commander of a revenue cutter should be directed
to pursue and retake a vessel which, after seizure, had
escaped from the custody of the law, and the officer in the
performance of that duty, and when necessary to overcome
resistance, should injure or kill a member of the crew of the
vessel he was ordered to recapture, and if for that act
he should be arrested and accused of crime under the State
authority, will any sensible person maintain that the
provisions of the _habeas corpus_ act could not be invoked for
his release, notwithstanding that no statute could be shown
which directly authorized the act for which he was arrested?
If by command of the President a company of troops were
marched into this city to protect the subtreasury from
threatened pillage, and in so doing life were taken, would not
the act of the officer who commanded the troops be an act
done in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and in the
lawful exercise of its authority? Could he be imprisoned and
tried before a State jury on the charge of murder, and the
courts of the United States be powerless to inquire into the
facts on _habeas corpus_, and to discharge him if found to
have acted in the performance of his duty? Can the authority
of the United States for the protection of their officers be
less than their authority to protect their property?
There appears to be but one rational answer to these
questions.
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