Undoubtedly the temptation
to press forward and dictate peace in Vienna was strong, but the
difficulties and disadvantages of such a step were many. He had but
20,000 men, for the Saxons could not be reckoned upon; and indeed
it was probable that their elector, whose jealousy and dislike of
Gustavus would undoubtedly be heightened by the events of the battle
of Breitenfeld, would prove himself to be a more than a doubtful
ally were the Swedish army to remove to a distance.
Tilly would soon rally his fugitives, and, reinforced by the numerous
Imperialist garrisons from the towns, would be able to overrun North
Germany in his absence, and to force the Saxons to join him even if
the elector were unwilling to do so. Thus the little Swedish force
would be isolated in the heart of Germany; and should Ferdinand
abandon Vienna at his approach and altogether refuse to treat
with him -- which his obstinacy upon a former occasion when in the
very hands of his enemy rendered probable -- the Swedes would find
themselves in a desperate position, isolated and alone in the midst
of enemies.
There was another consideration. An Imperialist diet was at
that moment sitting at Frankfort, and Ferdinand was using all his
influence to compel the various princes and representatives of the
free cities to submit to him. It was of the utmost importance that
Gustavus should strengthen his friends and overawe the waverers
by the approach of his army.
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