While Gustavus and Wallenstein
had been facing each other at Nuremberg the war had continued without
interruption in other parts, and the Swedes and their allies had
gained advantages everywhere except in Westphalia and Lower Saxony,
where Pappenheim had more than held his own against Baudissen, who
commanded for Gustavus; and although Wallenstein had checked the
king he had gained no material advantages and had wrested no single
town or fortress from his hands. Gustavus was still in Bavaria,
nearer to Munich than he was, his garrisons still holding Ulm,
Nordlingen, and Donauworth, its strongest fortresses.
He felt sure, however, that it would be impossible for Gustavus
to maintain at one spot the army which he had at Windsheim, and
that with so many points to defend he would soon break it up into
separate commands. He resolved then to wait until he did so, and
then to sweep down upon Northern Germany, and so by threatening
the king's line of retreat to force him to abandon Bavaria and the
south and to march to meet him.
At present he was in no position to risk a battle, for he had already
detached 4000 men to reinforce Holk, whom he had sent with 10,000
to threaten Dresden. The 13,000 Bavarians who were with him under
Maximilian had separated from him on his way to Forsheim, and
on arriving at that place his army numbered but 17,000 men, while
Gustavus had more than 40,000 gathered at Windsheim.
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