The Sceptics
likewise hoped to gain [Greek: ataraxia] by forming judgments 29
in regard to the anomaly between phenomena and the things of
thought, but they were unable to do this, and so they suspended
their judgment; and while their judgment was in suspension
[Greek: ataraxia] followed, as if by chance, as the shadow
follows a body. Nevertheless, we do not consider the Sceptic
wholly undisturbed, but he is disturbed by some things that are
inevitable. We confess that sometimes he is cold and thirsty,
and that he suffers in such ways. But in these things even the
ignorant are beset in two ways, from the feelings themselves, 30
and not less also from the fact that they think these conditions
are bad by nature. The Sceptic, however, escapes more easily, as
he rejects the opinion that anything is in itself bad by nature.
Therefore we say that the aim of the Sceptic is [Greek:
ataraxia] in matters of opinion, and moderation of feeling in
those things that are inevitable. Some notable Sceptics have
added also suspension of judgment in investigation.
CHAPTER XIII.
_The General Method of Scepticism._
Since we have said that [Greek: ataraxia] follows the suspension 31
of judgment in regard to everything, it behooves us to
explain how the suspension of judgment takes place. Speaking in
general it takes place through placing things in opposition to
each other. We either place phenomena in opposition to
phenomena, or the intellectual in opposition to the
intellectual, or reciprocally.
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