Let us
also consider reasoning, which is of two kinds, reasoning in 65
thought and in speech. Let us look first to that of thought.
This kind of reasoning, judging from the teachings of those
Dogmatics who are now our greatest opponents, those of the Stoa,
seems to fluctuate between the following things: the choice of
the familiar, and avoidance of the alien; the knowledge of the
arts that lead to this choice; and the comprehension of those
virtues that belong to the individual nature, as regards the
feelings. The dog then, upon whom it was decided to fix the
argument as an example, makes a choice of things suitable to 66
him, and avoids those that are harmful, for he hunts for food,
but draws back when the whip is lifted up; he possesses also an
art by which he procures the things that are suitable for him,
the art of hunting. He is not also without virtue; since the 67
true nature of justice is to give to every one according to his
merit, as the dog wags his tail to those who belong to the
family, and to those who behave well to him, guards them, and
keeps off strangers and evil doers, he is surely not without
justice. Now if he has this virtue, since the virtues follow 68
each other in turn, he has the other virtues also, which the
wise men say, most men do not possess. We see the dog also brave
in warding off attacks, and sagacious, as Homer testified when
he represented Odysseus as unrecognised by all in his house, and
recognised only by Argos, because the dog was not deceived by
the physical change in the man, and had not lost the [Greek:
phantasia kataleptike] which he proved that he had kept better
than the men had.
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