The Trope, _circulus in probando_, arises when the thing 169
which ought to prove the thing sought for, needs to be sustained
by the thing sought for, and as we are unable to take the one
for the proof of the other, we suspend our judgment in regard to
both. Now we shall briefly show that it is possible to refer
every thing under investigation to one or another of these
Tropes, as follows: the thing before us is either sensible or
intellectual; difference of opinion exists, however, as to what
it is in itself, for some say that only the things of sense 170
are true, others, only those belonging to the understanding, and
others say that some things of sense, and some of thought, are
true. Now, will it be said that this difference of opinion can
be judged or cannot be judged? If it cannot be judged, then we
have the result necessarily of suspension of judgment, because
it is impossible to express opinion in regard to things about
which a difference of opinion exists which cannot be judged. If
it can be judged, then we ask how it is to be judged? For 171
example, the sensible, for we shall limit the argument first to
this--Is it to be judged by sensible or by intellectual
standards? For if it is to be judged by a sensible one, since we
are in doubt about the sensible, that will also need something
else to sustain it; and if that proof is also something
sensible, something else will again be necessary to prove it,
and so on _in infinitum_.
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