It is clear then, that
whatever thing of sense is brought before us, it may be easily
referred to one of the five Tropes. And we come to a similar
conclusion in regard to intellectual things. For if it should be
said that there is a difference of opinion regarding them which
cannot be judged, it will be granted that we must suspend the
judgment concerning it. In case the difference of opinion 176
can be judged, if it is judged through anything intellectual, we
fall into the _regressus in infinitum_, and if through anything
sensible into the _circulus in probando_; for, as the sensible
is again subject to difference of opinion, and cannot be judged
by the sensible on account of the _regressus in infinitum_, it
will have need of the intellectual, just as the intellectual has
need of the sensible. But he who accepts anything which is
hypothetical again is absurd. Intellectual things stand also 177
in relation, because the form in which they are expressed
depends on the mind of the thinker, and, if they were in reality
exactly as they are described, there would not have been any
difference of opinion about them. Therefore the intellectual
also is brought under the five Tropes, and consequently it is
necessary to suspend the judgment altogether with regard to
every thing that is brought before us. Such are the five Tropes
taught by the later Sceptics. They set them forth, not to throw
out the ten Tropes, but in order to put to shame the audacity of
the Dogmatics in a variety of ways, by these Tropes as well as
by those.
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