For what else can have an
influence of this nature? But in order to pave the way for such a
sentiment, and give a proper discernment of its object, it is
often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede,
that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant
comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general
facts fixed and ascertained. Some species of beauty, especially
the natural kinds, on their first appearance, command our
affection and approbation; and where they fail of this effect, it
is impossible for any reasoning to redress their influence, or
adapt them better to our taste and sentiment. But in many orders
of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite
to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment;
and a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and
reflection. There are just grounds to conclude, that moral beauty
partakes much of this latter species, and demands the assistance
of our intellectual faculties, in order to give it a suitable
influence on the human mind.
But though this question, concerning the general principles of
morals, be curious and important, it is needless for us, at
present, to employ farther care in our researches concerning it.
For if we can be so happy, in the course of this enquiry, as to
discover the true origin of morals, it will then easily appear
how far either sentiment or reason enters into all determinations
of this nature [Footnote: See Appendix I].
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