I am sensible, that nothing can be more unphilosophical than to
be positive or dogmatical on any subject; and that, even if
excessive scepticism could be maintained, it would not be more
destructive to all just reasoning and inquiry. I am convinced
that, where men are the most sure and arrogant, they are commonly
the most mistaken, and have there given reins to passion, without
that proper deliberation and suspense, which can alone secure
them from the grossest absurdities. Yet, I must confess, that
this enumeration puts the matter in so strong a light, that I
cannot, at PRESENT, be more assured of any truth, which I learn
from reasoning and argument, than that personal merit consists
entirely in the usefulness or agreeableness of qualities to the
person himself possessed of them, or to others, who have any
intercourse with him. But when I reflect that, though the bulk
and figure of the earth have been measured and delineated, though
the motions of the tides have been accounted for, the order and
economy of the heavenly bodies subjected to their proper laws,
and Infinite itself reduced to calculation; yet men still dispute
concerning the foundation of their moral duties. When I reflect
on this, I say, I fall back into diffidence and scepticism, and
suspect that an hypothesis, so obvious, had it been a true one,
would, long ere now, have been received by the unanimous suffrage
and consent of mankind.
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