And a very accurate REASON or
JUDGEMENT is often requisite, to give the true determination,
amidst such intricate doubts arising from obscure or opposite
utilities.
But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be
sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of
qualities and actions; it is not alone sufficient to produce any
moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a
certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we
should feel the same indifference towards the means. It is
requisite a SENTIMENT should here display itself, in order to
give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies.
This SENTIMENT can be no other than a feeling for the happiness
of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are the
different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote.
Here therefore REASON instructs us in the several tendencies of
actions, and HUMANITY makes a distinction in favour of those
which are useful and beneficial.
This partition between the faculties of understanding and
sentiment, in all moral decisions, seems clear from the preceding
hypothesis. But I shall suppose that hypothesis false: it will
then be requisite to look out for some other theory that may be
satisfactory; and I dare venture to affirm that none such will
ever be found, so long as we suppose reason to be the sole source
of morals.
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