In the disquisitions of the understanding, from known
circumstances and relations, we infer some new and unknown. In
moral decisions, all the circumstances and relations must be
previously known; and the mind, from the contemplation of the
whole, feels some new impression of affection or disgust, esteem
or contempt, approbation or blame.
Hence the great difference between a mistake of FACT and one of
RIGHT; and hence the reason why the one is commonly criminal and
not the other. When Oedipus killed Laius, he was ignorant of the
relation, and from circumstances, innocent and involuntary,
formed erroneous opinions concerning the action which he
committed. But when Nero killed Agrippina, all the relations
between himself and the person, and all the circumstances of the
fact, were previously known to him; but the motive of revenge, or
fear, or interest, prevailed in his savage heart over the
sentiments of duty and humanity. And when we express that
detestation against him to which he himself, in a little time,
became insensible, it is not that we see any relations, of which
he was ignorant; but that, for the rectitude of our disposition,
we feel sentiments against which he was hardened from flattery
and a long perseverance in the most enormous crimes.
In these sentiments then, not in a discovery of relations of any
kind, do all moral determinations consist.
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