This was evidently the forerunner of
some ulterior design, although D'Aigullon, the prime minister of France,
endeavoured to keep those designs from the public view. He was, however,
unable to elude the vigilance, or to baffle the penetration of the
British cabinet. After expatiating on the ambition of Russia, as well
as the ties of honour and interest by which France was bound to
assist Sweden, D'Aigullon was informed by Lord Stormont, the British
ambassador, that, if France sent her ships into the Baltic, they would
be followed by a British fleet. The presence of two fleets, he said,
would have no more effect than a neutrality, and that, however the
British cabinet might desire peace between England and France, it was
impossible to foresee the consequences that might arise from accidental
collision. This had some effect, for the squadron at Brest was
countermanded; but soon after the French minister, in hopes of eluding
observation, gave orders for the equipment of an armament at Toulon,
under pretence of exercising the sailors of France in naval tactics.
Discovering this, the British cabinet made vigorous demonstrations of
resistance. The English ambassador was directed to declare that the
objections made against a fleet of France occupying the Baltic, applied
equally to the Mediterranean, and a memorial was presented to the French
minister, accompanied by a demand that it should be laid before the
king, and council.
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